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HOW	 MEANING	 MOVES:	TAN	 SITONG	 ON	 BORROWING	
ACROSS	 CULTURES
Leigh K. Jenco
National	University	of	Singapore
This	essay	offers	an	attempt	at	a	cross-cultural	inquiry	into	cross-cultural	inquiry	by	
examining	how	one	influential	Chinese	reformer,	Tan	Sitong	(1865–1898),	thought	
creatively	about	the	possibilities	of	learning	from	differently	situated	societies.	That	is	
to	say,	rather	than	focusing	on	developing	either	Tan’s	substantive	ideas	or	elaborat-
ing	a	methodology	for	how	such	an	approach	might	proceed,	I	mine	his	work	for	the	
methodological	lessons	it	offers.	I	hope	to	offer	both	argument	and	example	for	the	
possibility	not	only	that	culturally	distinct	ways	of	life	can	inform	each	other,	but	that	
such	influence	can	include	learning	theoretical	and	practical	means	by	which	such	
engagement	may	be	carried	out.	This	exploration	seems	especially	necessary	now	
that	political	theory	and	philosophy	increasingly	recognize	the	value	of	historically	
marginalized	thought	traditions,	but	nevertheless	continue	to	engage	those	traditions	
using	methodologies	rooted	in	their	own	concerns,	such	as	to	rectify	inequalities	of	
power	or	to	address	(mis-)representation	of	historically	marginalized	groups.1	One	
result	is	that	recent	theories	of	cross-cultural	understanding	in	Anglophone	political	
theory	and	philosophy	—	from	the	“politics	of	recognition”	to	comparative	political	
theory,	 liberal	 multiculturalism,	 cultural	 cosmopolitanism,	 and	 universal	 human	
rights	—	examine	culture	through	the	lens	of	culturally	embedded	individuals	or	texts,	
rather	 than	as	 a	 social	 phenomenon	constituted	by	 learned	practices.	The	 task	of	
cross-cultural	engagement	becomes	defined	as	how	to	negotiate	what	are	assumed	
to	be	fairly	intractable	(because	localized)	cultural	differences,	often	through	sympa-
thetic	understanding	of	the	other’s	conceptual	grammar	or	moral	values,	or	the	reg-
istration	of	singular,	non-Western	voices	within	existing	Eurocentric	conversations.2
One	reason	for	this	increasingly	circumscribed	practice	may	be	the	difficulty	of	
sharing	meaning	as	opposed	to	merely	forging	mutual	commensurability,	in	which	
the	 terms	 of	 the	 other	 are	 rendered	 intelligible	 by	 translating	 them	 into	 familiar	
v	ocabulary.	Here,	“meaning”	points	to	“the	ways	in	which	people	attempt	to	make	
apparent,	observable	 sense	of	 their	worlds	—	to	 themselves	and	 to	each	other	—	in	
emotional	and	cognitive	terms.”3	As	a	socially	produced	phenomenon	sustained	by	
community-wide	practices,	meanings	resist	identical	exportation	elsewhere	p	recisely	
because	of	their	diffuse	and	social	character	(a	characteristic	that	Charles	Taylor	and	
others	have	labeled	“intersubjectivity”4).	Recognizing	the	further	difficulty	of	trans-
planting	meanings	in	a	world	in	which	Eurocentric	discourses	govern	the	articulation	
of	cultural	identities,	the	goal	for	much	recent	cross-cultural	research	is	to	enhance	
self-reflexivity	about	one’s	own	values	 rather	 than	 to	ask	how	or	 if	one’s	 founda-
tional	assumptions	and	disciplinary	conversations	can	be	decisively	challenged,	and	
possibly	replaced,	by	foreign	ones.
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We	may	find	an	important	and	disruptive	contrast	to	these	recent	methodological	
claims	in	debates	associated	with	“Western	Learning”	(Xixue),	a	reform	m	ovement	that	
began	in	mid-nineteenth-century	China	that	urged	the	adoption	of	Western	i	nstitutions	
to	achieve	“wealth	and	power”	(fuqiang).	I	say	“disruptive”	because	these	claims	o	ffer	
both	an	instructive	critique	of	many	current	theories	of	cross-cultural	borrowing	and	
a	fairly	ambitious	alternative	vision	of	how	cross-cultural	inquiry	can	proceed.	Using	
the	vocabulary	of	dao	(substance,	Way)	and	qi	(vessel,	tool),	as	well	as	the	parallel	
and	more	well-known	dichotomy	of	ti	(substance	or	structuring)	and	yong	(function,	
use),	these	reformers	applied	long-standing	Chinese	strands	of	metaphysics	to	exam-
ine	the	conditions	under	which	meanings	and	social	practices	—	rather	than	discrete	
knowledge	or	individual	insight	—	can	move	across	communities.	By	attempting	the	
production	of	meaning	along	foreign	lines,	these	Western	Learning	reformers	ques-
tioned	whether	the	localization	of	meaning	entails	intractable	cultural	difference.
I	center	my	discussion	on	a	theory	about	the	relationship	between	dao	and	qi	
that	 the	 radical	 reformer	Tan	Sitong	 formulated	around	1895,	 in	 support	of	 “total	
Westernization”	(quanpan Xihua).	Following	but	ultimately	contesting	the	dominant	
ti/yong	 paradigm	 of	 the	 more	 conservative	 Foreign	Affairs	 School,	Tan	 parses	 the	
problem	out	in	this	way:	how,	if	at	all,	are	the	particular	concrete	manifestations	of	
the	Western	world	that	seem	so	brilliantly	useful	—	steam	engines,	guns,	tall	buildings	
—	related	to	the	values	or	principles	that	Western	people	seem	to	uphold?	How	can	
they	come	not	only	to	be	imitated	by	Chinese	but	also	to	have	meaning	for	them?	Tan	
recognized	that	these	meanings	were	related	but	irreducible	to	the	ideas	individuals	
held	separately	in	their	minds,	or	the	values	enforced	by	state	institutions.	In	r	esponse,	
he	 produces	 an	 original	 and	 unusually	 metaphysical	 account	 of	 how	 values	 and	
meaning	are	produced	and	consumed	across	society,	as	well	as	how	they	work	to	
support	more	observable	external	phenomena	such	as	parliamentary	government,	
technological	development,	and	social	practices	of	equality.
Tan’s	intervention	in	the	Western	Learning	debate,	in	my	view,	makes	at	least	two	
important	contributions	 to	 thinking	about	cross-cultural	borrowing.	First,	he	 looks	
beyond	 the	 individualized	understanding	and	partial,	episodic	 translation	 that	are	
the	goals	of	much	contemporary	cross-cultural	theory.	He	draws	attention	instead	to	
how	daos	(which	I	will	provisionally	translate	as	“meanings”)	are	socially	embedded	
and	produced	but	also	are	manifest	 in	externally	observable	practices	and	institu-
tions	(qi)	that	are	in	theory	replicable	in	other	communities.	Second,	by	stressing	the	
external	aspects	of	meaning-production,	he	provides	a	method	for	re-creating	cul-
tural	 forms	 in	other	contexts,	drawing	attention	 to	 the	possibility	and	necessity	of	
authentic	imitation	of	foreign	ways	of	life.	His	ambitions	to	authenticity,	however,	do	
not	affirm	a	cultural	essence	so	much	as	they	recognize	the	process	of	meaning	pro-
duction	as	driven	by	a	necessary	tension	between	continuity	or	replication	on	the	
one	hand	and	innovation	and	interpretation	on	the	other.	Tan	therefore	provides	an	
important	corrective	to	contemporary	accounts,	which,	in	emphasizing	culture	as	a	
construct	that	informs	the	values	or	choices	of	embedded	individuals,	tends	to	ignore	
the	ways	in	which	foreign	meaning	can	be	a	site	of	intellectual	discipline	as	well	as	
a	target	of	political	inclusion.
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Western Learning: Moving Meaning across Space?
Western	Learning	was	not	a	coherent	movement	so	much	as	a	diffuse	and	contested	
reaction	 to	conservatives	 in	 the	Qing	court,	who	believed	 that	 adoption	of	 select	
European	institutions	in	piecemeal	fashion	could	strengthen	the	Qing	state	and	Chi-
nese	society	while	maintaining	putatively	traditional	Chinese	social	values.	This	latter	
argument	was	first	put	forward	under	the	rubric	of	the	ti/yong	or	“essence/function”	
dichotomy,	a	Neo-Confucian	metaphysical	binary	with	numerous	analogues	(root	/
branch,	way/vessel)	that	came	to	structure	theories	of	cross-cultural	learning	on	both	
sides.5
The	most	famous	and	certainly	most	influential	application	of	the	ti/yong	binary	
was	advanced	by	Zhang	Zhidong	(1837–1909)	in	his	famous	1898	essay	Exhortation 
to Learning	(Quanxue pian). In	this	essay,	Zhang	insists	that	the	utilitarian,	functional	
aspects	(yong)	of	European	and	American	military	and	technical	knowledge	could	be	
combined	with	the	essential	features	or	substance	(ti)	of	China’s	moral	and	cultural	
heritage	while	leaving	them	fully	intact.	Zhang	helpfully	encapsulates	these	features	
as	 the	“three	bonds	and	five	relationships”	—	norms	of	social	hierarchy	that	Zhang	
insists	 “have	 been	 transmitted	 for	 several	 thousand	 years	 without	 changing	 their	
meaning.6	The	means	by	which	sages	are	sages,	the	way	by	which	China	(Zhongguo)	
is	China,	actually	lies	in	these.”7	Zhang	Zhidong’s	assessment	of	Chinese	culture	was	
at	times	both	essentialist	and	anachronistic,	but	it	assured	many	that	China’s	current	
political	problems	could	be	solved	without	radical	transformations	of	its	value	sys-
tem	and	way	of	life.	It	offered	a	double	emotional	payoff,	first	by	identifying	a	“true”	
essence	to	Chinese	culture	that	would	survive	time,	and	second	by	reducing	foreign	
capacities	to	“techniques.”	Although	for	Zhang	these	“techniques”	included	human-
istic	learning,	such	as	history	and	politics,	and	did	not	merely	signify	Western	tech-
nology,8	they	nevertheless	were	seen	to	complement	rather	than	transform	the	more	
sublime	end	informed	by	prior	understanding	of	Chinese	cultural	values.
Beginning	as	early	as	the	1860s,	however,	reformers	who	hoped	to	strengthen	
China	militarily	and	financially	by	borrowing	Western	technology,	such	as	Feng	Gui-
fen	 (1809–1874),	 began	 to	 point	 out	 that	 simple	 know-how	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	
produce	 the	 desired	 outcome:	 they	 realized	 (some	 before	 Zhang	 introduced	 his	
d	ichotomy)	that	Western	“use”	cannot	be	detached	from	its	metaphysical	basis	in	a	
very	Western	ti.	The	problem	for	Feng,	and	certainly	for	later	radical	reformers	around	
the	turn	of	the	century,	was	not	one	of	knowledge	but	of	practical	capacities	e	mbodied	
in	both	people	and	institutions.	These	thinkers	asked	not	“how	can	we	understand	
those	 who	 speak	 and	 act	 within	 a	 different	 frame	 of	 cultural	 reference?”	 or	 even	
“how	can	we	use	what	they	know?”	but	“how	can	we	‘go	on’	to	do	as	they	do?”	That	
it	was	the	latter	question	that	preoccupied	these	thinkers	can	be	seen	in	their	widely	
shared	belief	that	China	could	go	on	to	exceed	the	West	in	terms	of	ingenuity,	pro-
duction,	and	political	prosperity	and	stability	—	not	by	replicating	Western	technol-
ogy	but	by	innovating	as	the	Westerners	did.9	Although	some	resolved	this	crisis	of	
contrast	 by	 presuming	 a	 Chinese	 origin	 for	Western	 ingenuity	 and	 science,	 most	
o	thers	realized	that	borrowing	from	the	West	required	a	far	more	dramatic	and	what	
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we	may	call	an	explicitly	cultural	leap	—	that	is,	from	one	way	of	being	in	the	world	
and	organizing	society	to	another	with	a	jarringly	different	set	of	meanings	and	func-
tions.
This	insight	increased	in	sophistication	as	later	and	more	radical	critics	of	self-
strengthening	such	as	Wang	Tao	(1828–1897)	insisted	that	“managing	all	the	affairs	
under	heaven”	required	no	less	than	“total	change”	(yi bian)	in	Chinese	institutions	
and	ways	of	life.10	Zheng	Guanying	(1842–1922),	the	editor	of	the	volume	Shengshi 
weiyan	(Warnings	to	a	prosperous	age),	articulated	this	totalizing	concept	as	captur-
ing	the	Westerners’	ti	as	well	as	their	yong.	In	his	preface	to	this	work,	Zheng	implies	
that	 ti	 and	yong	were	not	dichotomized	along	Chinese/	Western	 lines	as	early	 re-
formers	would	have	it,	but	were	in	fact	two	aspects	of	the	same	reality,	and	both	were	
thus	necessary	targets	of	borrowing.	The	ti	required	to	embody	the	Western	techno-
logical	yong	lie	in	cultivating	particular	kinds	of	talent,	practicing	particular	kinds	of	
political	procedure	(specifically,	parliamentary	debate),	and	uniting	“ruler	and	peo-
ple.”	Anything	less,	in	Zheng’s	view,	is	“empty	talk”	that	would	render	Chinese	ca-
pacities	vis-à-vis	the	West	essentially	unchanged.11
Modern	historical	assessments	of	these	ti/yong	debates	focus	usually	on	the	rela-
tionship	between	“function”	and	“essence,”	interpreting	the	binary	either	as	a	logical	
unit12	or	as	a	functionally	separate	although	complementary	set	of	desirable	quali-
ties.13	A	more	interesting	question	might	be	why	cross-cultural	borrowing	was	—	and,	
in	much	contemporary	Chinese	scholarship,	continues	to	be	—	articulated	using	such	
terms.14	What	goals	do	such	terms	suggest,	and	do	they	enable	a	particular	way	of	
parsing	or	pursuing	cross-cultural	inquiry?
One	main	possibility	stands	out,	which	I	will	raise	here	and	use	the	remainder	of	
this	essay	to	elaborate.	Western	Learning	thinkers	—	at	least	those	opposed	to	what	in	
Chinese	scholarship	is	identified	as	the	“Foreign	Affairs	School”	of	Zhang	Zhidong	
and	his	colleagues	—	in	general	all	viewed	the	issue	of	cross-cultural	borrowing	as	a	
broad	social	or	political	transformation	along	new	lines	of	thought	and	action.	Those	
such	as	Yan	Fu	(1854–1921),	who	rejected	the	dichotomization	of	ti/yong,	continued	
to	 use	 it	 in	 different	ways	 to	 construct	 an	 ambitious	 foundation	 for	 cross-cultural	
learning.	As	Yan	pointed	out,	it	was	precisely	because	ti	was	so	closely	connected	to	
yong	that	neither	could	be	confined	to	one	culture	or	another.15	That	is,	rather	than	
seeking	merely	to	gain	commensurability	across	difference	or	knowledge	about	for-
eign	ways	of	life,	they	aimed	to	reproduce	whole	systems	of	meaning-making,	social	
organization,	and	political	order.
Tan	Sitong	offers	what	is	probably	the	most	systematic	and	thorough	theorization	
of	such	acts,	invoking	the	terms	dao	and	qi.	The	binary	of	dao	and	qi	maps	much	the	
same	relationship	between	substance/form	as	does	that	of	ti	and	yong,	a	point	that	
Tan	notes,16	but	the	alternative	phrasing	allows	him	to	connect	the	relationship	to	a	
complex	 interpretation	of	 the	Book of Changes	 advanced	by	Wang	 Fuzhi	 (1619–
1692),	the	Ming/Qing	transition	literatus	(and	Tan’s	fellow	Hunanese).17	The	dao/qi	
vocabulary	helps	Tan	to	theorize	a	form	of	cross-cultural	borrowing	that	seeks	first	to	
replicate,	and	then	goes	on	to	build	creatively	from,	alternative	foundations	—	those	
social,	political,	and	intellectual	constructs	possessing	the	capacity	to	ground	present	
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intelligibility	and	future	innovation.	In	a	later	section,	I	discuss	how	and	why	such	an	
“alternative	foundations”	approach	is	rarely	seen	as	a	possibility	within	contempo-
rary	theory,	but	I	first	explore	Tan’s	defense	of	his	more	radical	position.
Tan Sitong’s Argument for Western Learning and “Total Westernization”
As	one	of	 the	most	 dynamic	 and	passionate	 thinkers	 of	China’s	 late-Qing	 reform	
generation,	Tan	Sitong	makes	for	a	difficult	case	study.	Beginning	as	a	staunch	de-
fender	of	Chinese	ethnocentrism,	Tan	eventually	became	one	of	 the	more	 radical	
defenders	 of	Western	 Learning	 and	 then	 eventually	 a	 theorist	 of	 universal,	 proto-
cosmopolitan	values	in	his	magnum	opus	Renxue.18	But	in	defending	his	transition	
from	conservative	to	radical,	Tan	provides	considerable	insight	into	the	theoretical	
and	not	merely	logistical	insights	that	underlay	his	new	convictions.19	In	a	long	essay	
written	 for	his	 friend	Ouyang	Zhonggu,	 titled	“On	Promoting	Mathematics”	 (Xing 
suanxue yi),	and	in	a	letter	of	persuasion	sent	to	Bei	Yuanzheng,	both	written	around	
1896,	Tan	explains	his	radical	position	on	Western	Learning.	He	invokes	the	vocabu-
lary	of	dao	and	qi	to	offer	a	somewhat	ambiguous	but	theoretically	rich	framework	
to	support	his	reasons	for	such	an	ambitious	cultural	transformation.
Tan	begins	both	 letters	by	 trying	 to	convince	his	 interlocutors	not	only	of	 the	
worth	of	borrowing	more	thoroughly	from	the	West	than	earlier	reformers	had	ever	
conceded,	but	also	of	the	proper	method	for	such	borrowing.	At	several	points	he	
affirms	the	worth	of	Chinese	traditional	values	but	argues	that	in	the	present	times	
these	values	can	only	be	understood	with	respect	to	the	binary	of	dao	or	“way”	and	
qi	or	“vessel.”	Citing	Wang	Fuzhi’s	Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes,	Tan	
suggests	 that	 contemporary	 discourse	 has	 muddled	 the	 true	 relationship	 between	
these	two	entities	and	as	such	has	deprived	Western	Learning	and	“foreign	affairs”	
(yangwu)	of	any	substantive	capacity	to	benefit	Chinese	society	(Quanji,	pp.	196–
197).
Tan	follows	Wang	by	departing	from	typical	Neo-Confucian	readings	that	held	
dao	道	to	be	the	foundation	of	qi 器,	which	derived	from	the	distinction	between	li 
理,	general	metaphysical	principle	or	pattern,	and	qi2	氣,	the	material	embodiments	
or	forms	of	principle.20	Much	Neo-Confucian	philosophy,	beginning	with	the	Cheng	
brothers	in	the	early	Song,	held	that	not	only	was	this	qi2	inferior	to	li	but	that	it	also	
obscured	the	truth	it	contained.	In	contrast,	Wang	reversed	the	relationship,	holding	
that	it	was	in	fact	“vessels”	that	held	the	“way,”	or,	in	other	words,	the	particular	and	
concrete	that	predicated	the	general	and	abstract.21	This	departure	from	orthodoxy	
imbues	 the	dao	with	a	considerable	measure	of	creative	ambiguity;	dao	basically	
marks	the	plural	and	dynamic	outcomes	of	changing	qi,	resisting	consistent	transla-
tion	into	concrete	terms.
Tan	builds	on	Wang’s	heterodox	reading	to	argue	that	“what	people	today	call	
dao,	 without	 relying	 on	 qi,	 simply	 flails	 about	 in	 emptiness.”	 Citing	 Wang,	Tan	
	explains:
“There	is	no	dao	without	qi.	Without	a	bow	and	arrow	there	is	no	dao	of	archery;	without	
horses	and	vehicles	there	is	no	dao	of	driving.	.	.	.	The	Han	and	Tang	dynasties	did	not	
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have	the	dao	of	today,	and	there	are	many	examples	of	the	present	time	not	having	the	
dao	of	past	times.”	He	[Wang]	also	says,	“There	are	many	times	when	the	dao	can	be	had	
but	it	does	not	exist.	Therefore	there	is	no	dao	without	qi.”	Ah,	these	are	true	words.	If	we	
believe	these	words,	then	dao	must	rely	on	qi	before	you	can	have	practical	use;	it	is	not	
the	case	that	dao	exists	in	some	empty	objectless	space.	(Quanji,	pp.	160–161)
Tan’s	dao	and	qi	terminology	is	sometimes	seen	by	commentators	as	forwarding	a	
conservative	argument,	which	follows	earlier	ti/yong	binaries	rather	closely	to	urge	
the	instrumental	adoption	of	Western	technology	 (qi)	 to	assure	the	preservation	of	
Chinese	values	(dao).22	Yet	the	theoretical	framework	of	dao	and	qi —	as	well	as	Tan’s	
own	argument	—	suggests	a	more	radical	interpretation	in	which	Chinese	values	and	
ways	of	life	are	fundamentally	displaced	by	a	Western	dao	rather	than	preserved	by	
Western	qi.	As	Tan	remarks,	“Once	qi	has	changed,	can	dao	alone	remain	unchanged?	
Change	is	precisely	doing	qi,	and	qi	cannot	leave	dao.	People	cannot	abandon	qi;	
how,	then,	can	they	abandon	dao?”	(Quanji,	p.	197).23
According	to	this	logic,	adopting	Western	technology	(qi)	will	bring	along	with	it	
a	particular	kind	of	dao,	and	it	is	not	always	clear	that	this	dao	will	be	that	of	China’s	
ancient	sages.	Tan	does	suggest	that	Westerners	and	Chinese	share	the	same	kind	of	
dao —	meaning	that	their	qi	are	somehow	compatible	with,	if	not	outright	identical	
to,	already	existing	practices	and	moral	outlooks	of	contemporary	Chinese	(Quanji,	
pp.	197,	200).	Yet	he	follows	up	this	observation	with	a	long	celebration	of	Western	
social	 practices,	 from	 education	 to	 marriage	 arrangements,	 female	 l	iberation	 and	
parliamentary	assemblies	 (Quanji,	pp.	209–216).	These	qi	 imply	 staggeringly	pro-
found	social	and	political	transformations,	belying	his	insistence	that	any	past	Chi-
nese	dao	will	be	preserved.	He	admits	that	the	ancient	law	(gu fa)	was	well	ordered,	
but	it	is	gone,	because	there	are	no	supporting	institutions	remaining	to	invoke	it:
All	 these	 statutes,	 institutions,	 and	 the	 renowned	objects	 [of	 past	 times,	 including	 the	
well-field	system]	were,	tragically,	not	transmitted;	thus	they	are	not	things	that	later	gen-
erations	can	just	model	out	of	thin	air.	The	Duke	of	Zhou	recorded	these	devices	in	order	
to	establish	the	firm	foundation	of	the	law.	But	the	devices	cannot	be	revived,	and	their	
remainders	[in	the	present]	have	nothing	to	lean	on,	and	their	distance	[from	our	time]	
makes	them	hard	to	implement.	Therefore,	I	say,	without	its	qi	you	cannot	have	its	dao.	
(Quanji,	p.	201)
In	this	iteration	of	dao/qi,	Tan	makes	clear	his	view	of	dao	as	a	holistic	web	of	rela-
tionships	between	mutually	dependent	qi,	in	which	even	“remainders”	cannot	serve	
to	conjure	up	the	integrity	of	past	institutions:	each	time	has	its	own	dao	and	hence	
a	different	set	of	qi	to	inhabit.	Only	“changing	laws”	(or	“changing	ways,”	bian fa)	to	
reflect	Western	modes	of	doing	things	will	supply	the	qi	that	can	allow	Chinese	soci-
ety	 to	 flourish	 again	 (Quanji,	 p.	 227)	—	but	 given	 the	 protean	 working	 of	 qi,	 it	 is	
u	nclear	on	what	grounds	such	re-establishment	would	proceed.	In	a	bold	reversal	of	
anxieties	held	by	earlier	conservatives	such	as	Woren	(1804–1871),	who	condemned	
Western	Learning	 in	 the	belief	 that	Western	 ideas	and	objects	 could	contaminate	
Chinese	 values,	Tan	 complains	 in	 his	 treatise	 “Mathematics”	 that	 “we	 stagnantly	
adopt	only	the	branches	of	the	Westerners,”	that	is,	their	guns	and	ships,	but	“leave	
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behind	 their	 greatest	 essence”	 (Quanji,	p.	161).	The	problem	 for	Tan	 is	not	being	
contaminated	enough,	not	radically	 transforming	to	 the	degree	necessary	to	make	
Western	qi	(and	dao)	work.
Here	 and	 throughout	 the	 two	 essays	 he	 implicitly	 differentiates	 between	 two	
distinct	though	related	kinds	of	qi:	the	first	kind	points	to	the	actual	material	objects	
supplied	by	the	Westerners	—	military	hardware	and	technology,	ships,	Western	im-
ported	merchandise.	The	second,	less	clear-cut	kind	of	qi	points	to	the	faculties	or	
capacities	—	intellectual,	 social,	 institutional,	 economic	—	that	 produce	 these	 ob-
jects.24	These	latter	kinds	of	qi	are	what	Tan	seems	to	mean	when	he	speaks	of	the	
Westerners’	“greatest	essence,”	and	seem	to	be	encapsulated	in	the	concept	of	“law”	
(fa).	Throughout	Tan	insists	that,	contrary	to	popular	opinion,	Westerners	and	Chinese	
deep	down	possess	the	same	“nature”	(xing).	The	only	problem	is	how	each	orga-
nizes	society.	“Is	it	that	Westerners’	natures	are	good	while	ours	are	bad?	[No,	it	is	
that]	their	laws	are	good	and	their	intentions	impeccable,	while	we	have	no	laws.	If	
the	law	is	good	then	everyone	of	middling	quality	and	below	can	pull	themselves	out	
[of	their	predicaments];	if	there	is	no	law	then	even	those	above	middling	quality	will	
have	a	hard	time	standing	up	on	their	own.”	Like	Feng	Guifen	before	him,	Tan	recog-
nizes	that	learning	how	to	(re-)produce	Western	prosperity	is	more	important	than	
simply	attaining	the	material	products	that	could	help	defend	China	against	foreign	
incursion.	For	Feng,	however,	the	reasons	were	strategic:	only	by	adapting	to	the	times	
and	 learning	 the	Western	 tricks	—	such	as	physics,	modern	diplomacy,	and	 institu-
tional	organization	—	could	Westerners	be	driven	out	of	Chinese	territory	for	good.25
But	for	Tan	the	reasons	are	more	metaphysical.	Tan’s	reading	of	dao	and	qi	takes	
the	logic	of	Wang	Fuzhi	a	step	further	to	interrogate	the	relationships	between	the	
uses	of	items	(qi)	and	the	larger	social	patterns	they	demanded.	Continuing	to	hold,	
as	Wang	Fuzhi	did,	that	concrete	“tools”	(ju)	or	“vessels”	were	the	key	to	supporting	
dao,	Tan	concludes	from	this	premise	that	such	qi	can	actually	produce	a	particular	
dao,	in	this	case	one	closer	to	the	spirit	of	the	modern	West	than	to	the	ancient	Chi-
nese	past.	He	does	not,	after	all,	suggest	that	the	West	look	to	China	for	its	dao,	even	
as	 China	 appropriates	Western	 qi;	 if	 the	 two	 daos	 were	 actually	 the	 same,	 as	 he	
sometimes	says,	this	bilateral	movement	would	be	a	possibility.26
As	I	read	him,	Tan	is	suggesting	that	the	internal	complexity	of	Western	political	
and	social	institutions,	ways	of	life,	and	intellectual	organization	can	be	made	man-
ageable	by	means	of	a	particular	form	of	inquiry,	one	that	begins	with	the	particular	
(qi)	but	culminates	in	the	general	(dao).	To	avoid	“flailing	about	in	emptiness,”	one	
cannot	go	around	hoping	to	revive	a	dao —	any	dao —	directly,	because	this	has	little	
meaning	without	being	embedded	in	particular	contexts,	performances,	and	mate-
rial	objects.	Tan	specifies	that	learning	foreign	languages,	reading	foreign	newspa-
pers,	 and	 studying	 abroad	 are	 the	 first	 steps	 in	 this	 practice-	 and	 object-based	
borrowing,	to	be	followed	by	the	reform	of	education,	the	building	of	mines,	and	the	
developing	of	commerce	(Quanji,	pp.	162–163).	In	an	annotation	to	Tan’s	text,	Ou-
yang	Zhonggu	explains	further	that	this	means	the	“practicing	of	their	[i.e.,	Western]	
affairs”	will	enable	one	to	“complete	 the	qi”	appropriate	 to	Western	dao	 (Quanji,	
p.	171	n.	16).
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By	using	qi	 to	mean	not	only	material	objects	but	 those	particular	 systems	of	
knowledge	and	practice	deeply	implicated	in	the	production	of	meaning,	Tan’s	use	
of	the	term	bleeds	into	much	of	what	was	usually	taken	to	be	dao	or	ti	(substance).	
To	what,	then,	does	dao	point?	Although	outside	East	Asia	dao	is	best	known	for	the	
mystical	aura	associated	with	Daoist	practices,	 the	concept	points	 toward	a	much	
larger	and	more	general	set	of	concepts	 that	are	not	specific	 to	any	philosophical	
school.	Often	the	site	of	contestation	among	schools	as	to	whose	thought	best	ex-
presses	the	one	true	path,	dao	was	“the	word	most	often	used	to	talk	about	the	many	
ways	of	knowing,	and	sometimes	used	to	talk	about	a	higher	level	of	knowing	that	
subsumed	all	others.”27
Similarly,	Tan’s	dao	is	probably	best	understood	as	an	essentially	contested,	in-
terpretatively	open	concept	implicated	in	meaning-production	rather	than	the	site	of	
some	shared	self-identity.	His	pairing	of	the	term	with	qi	is	one	such	instance	of	using	
dao	as	a	capacious	analytic	category,	rather	than	a	marker	of	a	particular	philosoph-
ical	allegiance.	Tan	follows	Wang	Fuzhi	closely	in	that	the	proliferation	of	obviously	
different	kinds	of	qi	results	not	in	a	convergence	but	a	plurality	of	daos:	the	dao	of	
yesterday,	being	supported	by	different	qi	that	are	no	longer	in	existence,	implies	a	
different	dao	of	today.	This	is	why	law	changes	with	the	times	(Quanji,	p.	200).	Dao	
seems	to	be	the	architectonic	value	that	inhabits	physical	objects,	social	a	rrangements,	
persons,	and	groups,	making	them	alive	and	meaningful.	Without	the	right	kind	of	
dao,	Tan	argues,	imitating	rituals	or	acts	will	have	no	purpose.	To	those	who	wish	to	
revive	the	ancient	laws	instead	of	borrowing	Western	ones,	Tan	warns,	“imitate	them	
diligently,	but	in	the	end	it	will	simply	be	putting	on	a	show.	.	.	.	[T]he	cow	is	not	a	
cow,	the	horse	is	not	a	horse;	you	will	just	be	going	through	the	motions	to	no	real	
effect”	(Quanji,	p.	201).	There	is	a	causal	(yin)	effect	here:	“Having	height	is	caused	
by	(yin)	a	tall	hill;	being	low	is	caused	by	(yin)	a	marsh	or	river.	The	ancient	laws	are	
completely	gone,	and	 there	 is	nothing	 to	 serve	as	 their	 ‘cause’”	 (Quanji,	p.	201).	
Lacking	a	yin —	a	cause	or	a	motivation	—	the	ancient	law	lacks	a	dao.
Dao,	then,	is	akin	to	“culture”	in	that	it	not	only	conditions	but	constitutes	the	
relationships	among	and	between	these	entities;	it	enables	and	renders	meaningful	
the	 faculties	 that	 qi	 implies.	This	 mutually	 constitutive	 process	 is	 not	 adequately	
d	escribed	as	a	relationship	between	form	and	substance,	between	a	yong	and	a	ti.	
Rather	it	gestures	toward	the	mutual	co-appearance	of	each	and	therefore	implies	a	
relationship	of	dynamic	adjustment	and	change.	To	Wang	Fuzhi,	Tan’s	inspiration,	
this	 relationship	between	what	we	can	perhaps	better	 translate	as	appearance	 (qi)	
and	 way	 (dao)	 documents	 the	 cyclical	 and	 ever-changing	 processes	 of	 all-under-
Heaven.	The	Changes	scholar	Hellmut	Wilhelm	summarizes	these	processes	as	undi-
rected	dynamism,	mapped	but	not	exhausted	by	“images”	(xiang —	words,	objects,	
forms).28	Such	images	—	Tan’s	qi —	are	like	orienting	coordinates	for	events	and	ac-
tions;	they	are	form,	but	also	a	kind	of	dynamic	“forming.”29
In	the	case	of	the	more	radical	reformers	of	Western	Learning,	replicating	or	bor-
rowing	qi	acknowledges	the	deeply	interconnected	systems	of	meanings	and	prac-
tice	 that	 enable	 qi	 to	 exist	 at	 particular	 times	 and	 places,	 but	 without	 implying	
beforehand	what	“Western”	dao(s)	will	look	like;	it	allows	for	learning	and	develop-
100	 Philosophy	East	&	West
ment	to	occur	along	Western	lines,	without	claiming comprehensive knowledge of 
any given dao.	Dao	and	qi	thus	enable	a	form	of	borrowing	that	points	beyond	the	
limits	of	personal	comprehension	or	cross-cultural	intelligibility	to	imitative	projects	
meant	to	capture	—	and	further	develop	in	perhaps	unanticipated	ways	—	the	socially	
distributed	knowledge	and	practices	of	a	cultural	other.
Tan’s	 work	 suggests	 a	 more	 complex	 application	 of	 the	 ti/yong	 and	 dao/qi	
d	ichotomies,	 but	 he	 shares	much	 in	 common	with	his	 earlier	 progenitors.	 Zhang	
Zhidong’s	classic	 ti/yong	dichotomy	(“Chinese	learning	for	 ti	 [substance],	Western	
learning	for	yong	[use]”)	was	later	rejected	by	thinkers	such	as	Yan	Fu	on	the	basis	of	
its	obvious	ontological	impossibility,30	but	it	nevertheless	furnishes	a	model	for	situ-
ating	cultures	in	relation	to	each	other	that	establishes	an	important	framework	for	
how	future	Western	Learning	in	China	would	be	conceptualized.	Believing,	as	Zhang	
did,	that	Western	yong	(technology,	medicine,	methods	of	warfare)	could	be	injected	
wholesale	into	Chinese	ti	(the	web	of	social	and	moral	values	underwritten	by	Chi-
nese	political	organization)	recognizes	that	even	“practical”	cultural	forms	such	as	
applied	technology	are	not	simply	lodged	in	individual,	representative	persons	but	
are	embodied	in	institutions	—	whether	these	institutions	have	material	presence	in	
the	form	of	buildings	and	personnel,	or	social	presence	in	the	form	of	rules,	laws,	or	
“logics.”	The	problem	Zhang	seeks	to	address	by	dichotomizing	ti	and	yong	is	pre-
cisely	the	problem	Tan	addresses	by	insisting	that	the	two	concepts	are	mutually	re-
lated:	they	reflect	the	enormity	of	borrowing	as	an	institutional,	society-wide	process.	
If	Chinese	substance	can	stand	 in	place	of	Western	substance	 to	 support	Western	
utility,	as	Zhang	believes,	then	the	analytic	(not	to	mention	logistic)	obstacles	to	this	
form	of	cross-cultural	borrowing	are	drastically	abated.	If	this	is	not	possible,	as	Tan	
believes,	 then	 more	 thoroughgoing,	 society-wide	 transformations	 must	 take	 place	
and	dao	will	be	transformed.	By	building	on	the	view	that	China	could	borrow	from	
the	West,	Tan	affirms	both	“Chinese”	and	“Western”	daos	as	distinct	sites	of	thought	
and	experience.
Contemporary Counterarguments
Such	a	theorization	of	exchange	with	this	imitative	goal	in	mind	may	seem	both	use-
less	and	unfeasible.	Today	few	individuals,	much	less	whole	societies,	are	willing	to	
displace	 completely	 their	 indigenous	 ways	 of	 thinking	 and	 practice	 with	 foreign	
ones.	Gadamer’s	insight	into	the	prejudicial	process	of	all	knowledge-formation	sug-
gests	further	that	such	wholesale	imitation	may	not	even	be	possible.31	If	we	neces-
sarily	understand	new	ideas	only	by	reference	to	what	we	already	know,	how	can	we	
ever	 completely	 replace	 our	 own	 categories	 with	 foreign	 ones?	 In	 contemporary	
p	olitical	theory	and	philosophy,	this	Gadamerian	logic	informs	at	least	two	distinct	
arguments	against	wholesale	borrowing	of	the	kind	Tan	advocated.	Both	see	the	fun-
damental	dilemma	of	cross-cultural	learning	as	negotiating	(rather	than	overcoming)	
these	deep	Gadamerian	prejudices,	or	background	assumptions,	 that	make	cross-
cultural	borrowing	impossible	or	distorting,	and	each	offers	an	alternative	picture	of	
how	the	process	can	proceed	given	these	restraints.
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The	first	argument	speaks	from	the	political	difficulties	of	plural	cultural	identity,	
often	articulated	as	hybridity	or	vernacular	cosmopolitanism,	negotiated	politically	
by	way	of	the	“politics	of	difference.”	This	mode	of	negotiating	difference	seeks	the	
inclusion	of	ethnically	inflected	life	experiences	into	political	decision-making	as	a	
means	of	abating	domination,	enriching	debate,	and	securing	voice	to	typically	mar-
ginalized	individuals	and	groups.32	In	a	world	“remade	by	colonization”	and	bereft	
of	foundationalist,	Archimedean	vantage	points	that	presume	to	adjudicate	universal	
value,	these	contextualized	negotiations	—	whether	within	liberal-democratic	domi-
ciles	or	within	the	global	arena	writ	large	—	have	become	increasingly	attractive	to	
political	theorists	and	comparative	philosophers	hoping	to	efface	legacies	of	Western	
domination.33	To	 avoid	 the	 imposition	 of	 essentialism,	 and	 to	 capture	 the	 hybrid	
character	of	much	contemporary	cultural	identity,	many	theorists	in	political	theory	
and	 philosophy	 attend	 carefully	 to	 the	 particular,	 power-saturated	 circumstances	
within	and	for	which	cultural	exchange	takes	place.	Modeling	their	efforts	on	egali-
tarian	dialogue,	these	theorists	analogize	cross-cultural	exchange	to	the	interaction	
between	embedded	persons	who	offer	up	categories	of	analysis	for	examination.34
The	 result	 is	a	process	of	contestation	 in	which	new	visions	of	 self	and	other	
emerge,	a	dialogic	interplay	“animated	by	both	sympathy	and	resistance,	a	willing-
ness	to	balance	understanding	and	self-transgression,”	which	leaves	differences	in-
tact	rather	than	attempting	full	transparency.35	Understood	in	this	way,	comparative	
philosophy	is	an	open-ended,	mutually	transformative	process	rather	than	a	system	
of	absolute	adjudication	between	 two	or	more	purportedly	discrete	philosophical	
systems.	Comparative	philosophy	takes	place	in	a	“dialogic”	manner	within	and	be-
tween	particular,	already	situated	philosophical	systems	(what	the	comparative	phi-
losopher	Raimundo	Panikkar	generalizes	as	“topoi”)	that	inevitably	begins	from	some	
particular	philosophy	but	nevertheless	subjects	everything	to	critical	scrutiny.36
The	second	argument	takes	the	difficulties	of	learning	across	cultures	even	more	
seriously,	calling	into	question	even	minimal	dialogic	transformation.	In	a	critique	of	
current	work	in	cosmopolitanism,	specifically	the	work	of	Jeremy	Waldron,	Pratap	
Mehta	argues	that	attempts	to	appropriate	foreign	cultural	forms	are	much	more	dif-
ficult	than	cosmopolitans	—	and,	we	may	add,	comparative	political	theorists	—	often	
suppose,	precisely	for	the	reason	that	such	forms	rely	on	potentially	i	ncommensurable	
and	deeply	lodged	background	assumptions	that	give	them	meaning.	Waldron	claims	
that	“we	need	culture,	but	we	do	not	need	cultural	 integrity,”	simply	because	 the	
significance	of	cultural	materials	turns	for	each	person	on	what	are	often	misinterpre-
tations	of	their	original	context.	These	materials	are	simply	available	for	the	taking,	
“as	more	or	less	meaningful	fragments,	images,	snatches	of	stories.”37	Mehta	insists,	
however,	that	this	abuses	the	very	idea	of	what	culture	is	supposed	to	do.	The	existing	
cultural	context	in	which	foreign	forms	are	appropriated	“alters	them	beyond	recog-
nition	and	often,	rather	than	complicating	the	culture	that	appropriates	them,	is	made	
quite	compatible	with	its	governing	premises.”38	He	echoes	theorists	of	incommen-
surability	such	as	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	who	connects	 the	values	of	particular	 tradi-
tions	 to	 their	 specific	embodiments	 in	shared	practices,	histories,	and	 institutions.	
According	to	MacIntyre,	these	values	cannot	be	divorced	from	the	particular	social	
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order	or	cultural	phenomena	from	which	they	emerge	and	still	retain	their	intelligi-
bility.39
From	this	perspective,	those	such	as	Jeremy	Waldron	who	believe	that	i	ndividuals	
can	freely	appropriate	foreign	ideas	and	ways	of	life	are	left	defending	a	rather	unten-
able	view	of	culture	as	independent	of	institutions,	including	shared	social	norms.	If	
we	define	culture	as	“intelligent	and	intelligible	structures	of	meaning,”	as	Waldron	
does,40	then	culture	demands	a	particular	institutional	embodiment.	For	the	liberal	
political	philosopher	Will	Kymlicka,	this	recognition	of	embodiment	justifies	extend-
ing	special	rights	to	minorities,	to	protect	their	shared	ways	of	life	from	encroach-
ment	 by	 the	 larger	 culture	 in	 which	 they	 are	 territorially	 embedded.41	 By	 seeing	
cultural	life	as	so	deeply	embedded	in	a	collective	lifestyle	that	its	community	must	
enjoy	 political	 rights	 to	 assure	 its	 future	 existence,	 he	—	along	 with	 Mehta	 and	
M	acIntyre	—	suggests	the	impossibility	of	a	borrowed	culture	or	cultural	form	versus	
merely	a	borrowed	idea	that	exists	independently	of	the	sociopolitical	constructs	that	
produced	it.
Based	on	these	two	arguments	about	the	embedded	nature	of	cultural	constructs,	
Tan	Sitong’s	intuition	about	the	necessity	for	framing	culture	by	way	of	institutions	or	
“qi”	seems	to	work	against	him:	Mehta,	Kymlicka,	and	those	influenced	by	Gadamer	
all	argue	in	different	ways	that	it	is	precisely	because	cultural	forms	have	some	form	
of	institutional	embodiment	that	their	appropriation,	assimilation,	or	comprehension	
by	others	is	so	problematic	as	to	be	unlikely.	Dallmayr	and	Panikkar,	in	particular,	
argue	that	a	fusion	of	horizons	or	affiliative	associations	mediated	by	dialogic	inter-
action	is	the	most	radical	outcome	that	is	cognitively	possible	for	such	irreducibly	
situated	human	beings.
But	Tan’s	work	and	the	intuitions	of	his	fellow	Western	Learning	thinkers	help	to	
steer	a	path	between	the	view	that	cultural	 forms	are	either	independent	of	social	
organization	and	institutions,	on	the	one	hand,	or	are	so	dependent	on	such	institu-
tions	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 meaningfully	 borrowed,	 on	 the	 other.	 Where	 Waldron	
r	ejects	or	fails	to	consider	a	definition	of	culture	as	institutionally	reliant,	and	com-
parative	political	theorists	read	culture	as	accessible	only	partially	through	dialogic	
interaction	 with	 embedded	 individuals,	 Tan	 insists	 that	 culture	—	constituted	 by	
c	omplex	and	dynamic	daos	whose	true	scope	is	essentially	unknowable	to	any	one	
human	—	necessarily	is	grasped	and	embodied	only	in	qi	 (material	objects,	institu-
tions,	texts,	and	so	on).	But	he	does	not	follow	Kymlicka	or	Mehta	to	conclude	that	
this	institutional	embodiment	implies	a	view	of	culture	confined	to	those	who	are	
born	into	it,	or	Gadamer	to	conclude	that	at	best	a	“fusion	of	horizons”	will	be	forged	
to	create	a	kind	of	third	cultural	space	or	understanding	irreducible	to	the	original	
two.	 Rather,	 the	 very	 replicability	 of	 qi	 enables	 the	 portability	 of	 culture	—	not	 in	
Waldron’s	cosmopolitan	sense,	which	“ignores	the	dependence	of	these	practices	on	
incommensurable	 background	 presuppositions”	 and	 assumes	 we	 can	 hybridize	
e	asily	and	quickly	by	adopting	superficial	markers	of	cultural	distinction,42	but	in	a	
much	deeper,	more	practical	sense,	which	wrestles	with	the	difficulties	of	social	and	
not	just	individual	transformation.
In	contrast	to	incommensurability	theorists	such	as	MacIntyre,	whose	solution	to	
the	problem	of	 incommensurability	 involves	 familiarizing	erstwhile	outsiders	with	
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the	canonical	languages	of	particular	traditions,43	Tan	broaches	the	need	for	institu-
tional	 re-creation	 of	 foreign	 traditions	 on	 native	 soil,	 and	 not	 just	 an	 individual’s	
initiation	into	existing	discourses.	Although	these	transformations	will	likely	be	beset	
by	issues	of	translation	and	commensurability	best	handled	in	a	“conversational”	or	
dialogic	way,	to	leave	the	issue	of	borrowing	there	would	be	to	ignore	the	very	real	
need	to	frame	(and	borrow)	cultural	forms	in	a	set	of	institutions	that	can	support	a	
broad	range	of	personal	interests,	needs,	talents,	and	certainly	interpretations.
Specifically,	Tan’s	dao/qi	analysis	suggests	that	meanings,	or	daos,	have	i	mportant	
institutional	components	that	are	produced	by,	yet	at	the	same	time	enable,	p	articular	
kinds	of	knowledge	and	understanding.	Meaning-	(or	dao-)	making	is	keyed	not	to	
ethnic	background	or	idiosyncrasy	so	much	as	specific,	but	replicable,	learning	pro-
cesses	that	take	shape	in	particular	areas	and	at	particular	times.	As	such,	it	cannot	
be	captured	in	a	dialogic	encounter	and	requires	a	far	more	ambitious	account	of	
authenticity,	namely	of	how	particular	cultural	 forms	can	be	faithfully	reproduced	
within	foreign	communities.
Authenticity
Authenticity	may	not	be	the	most	felicitous	English	term	for	Tan’s	attempt,	but	it	cap-
tures	the	range	of	meaning	(and	the	urgency)	indicated	by	Tan’s	(and	his	colleagues’)	
use	of	words	like	“imitate”	(xiaofa)	and	“take	as	model”	(fa, mofang).	In	contrast	to	
more	conservative	defenders	of	Chinese	cultural	identity	such	as	Zhang	Zhidong,	Tan	
and	 other	 reformers	 wanted	 China	 to	 adopt	 institutions,	 such	 as	 parliamentary	
g	overnment,	 that	 were	 not	 creative	 interpretations	 of	 those	 institutions	 but	 were	
themselves	those	institutions	—	that	is,	they	had	to	mean	to	Chinese	what	they	meant	
to	Westerners.	This	authorized	a	broadly	 transformative	process	 that	 in	Tan’s	view	
could	and	should	displace	native	Chinese	values,	whatever	those	were	supposed	to	
be,	with	ones	that	either	produced	or	constituted	Western	daos.
For	the	most	part,	such	questions	of	“authentic”	replication	have	been	bracketed	
as	irrelevant	to	the	power	relations	that	are	really	mediating	cross-cultural	exchange,44	
or	discredited	as	fundamentally	misguided	efforts	that	reduce	the	complexities	of	an	
entire	 culture	 to	 a	 singular	 essentialized	 identity.45	 However,	 authenticity	 is	 itself	
ambiguous,	and	its	persistent	association	with	notions	of	cultural	purity	or	absolu-
tized	identity	does	not	exhaust	its	potential	implications	for	cross-cultural	exchange.	
In	his	study	of	authenticity	and	culture,	Charles	Linholm	points	out	that	“there	are	
two	overlapping	modes	for	characterizing	any	entity	as	authentic:	genealogical	and	
historical	(origin)	and	identity	or	correspondence	(content). . .	.	[T]hese	two	forms	of	
authenticity	are	not	always	compatible.”46	Although	cultural-identity	politics	often	
turn	on	rubrics	that	emphasize	one	or	the	other,	we	can	instead	discern	the	tension	
animating	both.	In	emphasizing	conformity	to	some	external	standard	or	logic,	both	
definitions	of	authenticity	turn	analysis	away	from	subjectively	experienced	or	inter-
preted	 experience	 toward	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 communities	 of	 individuals	 govern,	
produce,	and	contest	meaning.
Authenticity	becomes	such	a	 recurring	element	of	Tan’s	analysis	precisely	be-
cause	he	and	his	 reformist	colleagues	believe	 that	 “learning	 from	 the	West”	must	
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extend	 beyond	 the	 individuals	 participating	 in	 it	 to	 produce	 non-subjectivist,	
c	ommunity-generated	systems	of	meaning.	They	recognize	that	meanings	by	defini-
tion	are	not	created	ex	novo	by	individuals,	nor	are	they	contained	definitively	w	ithin	
any	particular	exchanges.	Rather,	they	are	produced	and	consumed	over	time	and	by	
large	numbers	of	people,	making	faithfulness	or	correlation	with	some	standard	of	
interpretation	or	deployment	a	constituent	part	of	the	learning	or	borrowing	process.	
Tan’s	analysis	thus	suggests	how	authenticity	can	help	us	articulate	a	set	of	new	and,	
I	believe,	productive	dilemmas	for	cultural	exchange	that	extend	beyond	simply	es-
sentialist	identity:	namely,	which	criteria	and	standards	hold	for	cultural	production,	
where	and	by	whom	are	they	mediated,	and	how	must	whole	communities	change	
to	apply	 them?	These	dilemmas	demand	not	 so	much	a	definitive	 response	as	an	
a	ccount	of	how	meanings	—	semiotic	systems	generated	from	but	irreducible	to	the	
plurality	of	discrete	individual	exchanges	that	comprise	them	—	can	be	transported	
across	communities.
Note	the	way	these	two	definitions	of	“authentic”	from	the	Oxford English Dic-
tionary	in	some	ways	contradict	each	other:
4.	Original,	first-hand,	prototypical;	as	opposed	to	copied.	Obs.
5.	Real,	actual,	‘genuine.’	(Opposed	to	imaginary,	pretended.)	arch.47
The	first	definition	claims	that	in	order	for	something	to	be	authentic	or	genuine,	it	
must	be	chosen	or	felt	spontaneously	and	thus	be	“first-hand,”	not	having	any	prior	
origin	or	motive	(a	genuine	feeling	of	regret,	an	authentic	religious	experience).	This	
is	how	the	term	is	used	in	much	contemporary	discourse,	a	tendency	some	attribute	
to	the	power	and	influence	of	Protestant	Christianity	and	its	emphasis	on	sincere	in-
dividual	choice	in	securing	religious	belief.48	The	second	definition,	however,	deems	
something	authentic	in	the	sense	of	“genuine”	if	it	accords	with	some	external	stan-
dard	or	quality,	like	an	authentic	diamond,	“the	genuine	article,”	or	“the	real	thing.”	
In	fact,	the	latter	two	phrases	have	been	appropriated	—	correctly,	it	is	worth	noting	—	
by	a	range	of	companies	selling	mass-produced	goods	(blue	jeans,	carbonated	bever-
ages)	that	are	identical	to	each	other	but	presumably	meaningfully	distinct	in	some	
way	from	otherwise	very	similar	products.	It	is	only	by	being	part	of	a	group	or	series	
of	items	recognizable	as	that	thing	that	something	can	be	considered	to	be	“really”	
that	thing.	How	else	would	we	know	to	call	it	—	and	even	more	to	the	point,	upon	
inspection	confirm	it	—	as	such?	Authenticity	and	genuineness	imply	an	account	of	
origins,	but	they	do	not	require	that	something	be	an	origin	in	itself;	it	need	simply	
be	something	that	has	sprung	from	or	is	closely	connected	to	some	valued	origin.
Consider	 these	 definitions	 of	 “genuine”	 from	 the	 Oxford English Dictionary	
(which	explicitly	identify	the	word	with	“authenticity”):
3.	Really	proceeding	from	its	reputed	source	or	author;	not	spurious;	=	AUTHENTIC.49
4.	a.	Having	 the	character	or	origin	 represented;	 real,	 true,	not	counterfeit,	unfeigned,	
unadulterated.	(the) genuine article.50
By	 these	definitions,	 it	 is	only	 through	 faithful	 reproduction	and	 transmission	 that	
something	 can	 come	 to	 be	 called	 authentic.	 Firsthand	 creation	 or	 individualized	
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flourishes	would	 imply	heterodoxy,	a	bastard	 lineage	—	in	other	words,	 something	
spurious	 and	 profoundly	 inauthentic.	 Charles	Taylor	 indicates	 some	 of	 this	 sense	
when	he	points	out	that	“authentic”	commitments	need	not,	and	in	fact	cannot,	be	
rooted	only	in	subjective,	personal	value;	rather,	their	significance	must	be	indepen-
dent	of	us	and	our	desires	as	a	precondition	of	 their	making	 sense.51	These	 same	
concerns	drove	the	scholars	of	the	Han	Learning	movement	of	the	late	Qing	dynasty,	
which	sought	to	establish	authentic	lineages	for	Confucian	texts	that	they	believed	
had	been	corrupted	by	forgeries.	Ironically,	in	their	quest	for	a	genuine	or	true	source	
of	 Confucianism	 unclouded	 by	 generations	 of	 (particular)	 textual	 mediation,	 they	
mimicked	 the	 very	 people	 whose	 influence	 they	 sought	 to	 eradicate:	 the	 daoxue	
Neo-Confucianists,	 who	 believed	 that	 internal	 self-ordering	 and	 reflection	 rather	
than	excessive	reliance	on	texts	would	reveal	the	true	principle	(li)	obscured	beneath	
layers	of	material	existence	(qi2).	Both	were	rejecting	(different)	forms	of	textual	con-
vention	 to	 reveal	a	more	authentic	Confucian	 learning,	 in	which	authenticity	was	
constituted	not	by	an	act	of	spontaneous	and	original	creativity	but	by	the	faithful	
replication	of	what	the	ancients	really	meant.	For	the	scholars	of	Han	Learning,	this	
meant	 establishing	 an	 authentic	 lineage	 of	 transmission	 from	 the	 ancients	 to	 the	
p	resent;	for	the	Neo-Confucian	daoxue	advocates,	this	demanded	conformity	to	an	
externally	verifiable	principle	(li).
On	this	basis,	we	can	recognize	that	authenticity	need	not	mean	a	shameless	or	
empty	rip-off	of	some	putatively	discrete	practice,	nor	need	it	presume	exhaustive	
knowledge	of	the	subject	of	imitation.	For	many	thinkers	of	Han	Learning,	such	as	
Tan’s	associate	Kang	Youwei,	authenticating	texts	was	a	means	of	advancing	quite	
radical	interpretations	to	reclaim	a	heritage	they	believed	had	been	lost	amidst	the	
subjectivist	emphasis	of	Neo-Confucian	lixue.52	For	others,	such	as	Gu	Yanwu,	the	
search	for	authenticity	encouraged	a	critical	engagement	with	the	past	so	radical	that	
it	threatened	to	demolish	the	very	classical	learning	it	was	marshaled	to	support.53	
Regardless	of	to	what	extent	such	authentication	aimed	to	change	widely	accepted	
standards	of	what	constituted	the	“real”	Confucian	dao,	 it	nevertheless	demanded	
intelligible	standards	external	to	the	act	of	appropriation	itself:	what	constitutes	au-
thenticity,	and	who	will	accept	the	evidence	supporting	such	a	claim?	What	kinds	of	
communities	can	be	configured	or	built	to	sustain	this	new	family	of	standards,	and	
how	can	these	standards	come	to	be	meaningful	for	them?
One	of	the	counterintuitive	results	of	this	analysis	is	that	authenticity,	far	from	
tying	the	self	ineradicably	to	its	own	cultural	origins,	actually	offers	a	way	for	com-
munities	 to	replicate	foreign	ways	of	 life	by	pointing	to	the	external	practices	and	
standards,	 rather	 than	 the	 inscrutable	 interpretations	 of	 individuals,	 that	 sustain	
meaning	and	intelligibility.	This	 is	why,	 for	Tan,	authenticity	 is	 linked	 to	qi,	which	
generates	but	does	not	definitively	determine	the	standards	of	intelligibility	that	would	
make	particular	Western	forms	both	work	and	make	sense	within	a	foreign	commu-
nity.	The	process	begins	with	the	(re-)creation	of	externally	observable	practices	and	
institutions,	and	from	there	calls	into	being	a	collective	rather	than	merely	an	indi-
vidual	 sense	of	how	a	given	 institution	 functions	as	 the	 thing	 it	actually,	 really,	 is	
supposed	by	its	diverse	participants	to	be.	Authentic	qi	and	innovative	dao	both	mark	
and	give	life	to	the	tension	between	original	creation	and	faithful	replication	at	the	
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heart	of	all	learning,	cross-cultural	learning	in	particular.	Read	in	this	way,	the	imita-
tion	of	Western	“qi”	can	be	seen	not	as	mindless	copying	but	as	a	profound	insight	
into	the	collectively	sustained	nature	of	political	institutions,	values,	and	practices.	
Like	the	antiquity	of	late	Imperial	kaozheng	scholars,	the	cultural	subjects	of	such	
imitations	do	not	 present	 themselves	 to	borrowers	 as	 “finished	products.”	Rather,	
they	have	to	be	“rediscovered	and	reconstructed.”54
I	would	like	to	suggest	that	aspiring	to	such	(chastened)	authenticity	is	a	neces-
sary	part	of	any	attempt	to	extend	foundational	principles	to	meet	new	challenges,	to	
learn	or	be	converted	to	a	new	way	of	thinking	that	implies	a	series	of	interconnected	
and	embedded	networks	of	meaning,	rather	than	discrete	concepts	somehow	held	to	
be	intelligible	in	isolation	from	each	other	and	from	the	logical,	social,	and	intellec-
tual	matrices	 that	 embody	 their	meaning.	Whatever	one’s	views	on	 the	 futility	or	
necessity	of	authenticity	in	cross-cultural	exchange,	it	is	clear	that	such	issues	persis-
tently	return	—	it	seems	that	the	(self-conscious,	at	least)	point	of	the	exercise	is	not	to	
reinforce	what	is	known	or	even	to	syncretize	fragmented	and	half-understood	cul-
tural	forms	but	to	learn	something	new	and	complete	that	is	radically	transformative.
A	notion	of	authenticity	is	necessary,	moreover,	if	we	are	to	avoid	confounding	
the	comparison	of	individual	expressions	or	worldviews	with	the	comparison	of	“cul-
tures.”	In	an	attempt	to	avoid	essentialism,	theorists	of	the	mutual-intelligibility	ap-
proach	leave	open	the	question	of	whether	the	difference	being	crossed	or	the	forms	
being	borrowed	are	“cultural”	or	merely	idiosyncratic.	By	reducing	comparative	phi-
losophy	and	theory	to	an	exchange	between	situated	interlocutors,	whether	actual	
(as	 in	difference	politics)	or	reconstructed	(from	canonical	 texts	and	other	media),	
these	approaches	all	model	cross-cultural	influence	or	exchange	as	a	performance	
by	individuals.	The	negotiation	of	cultural	difference	acts	either	to	interrogate	self-
identity	(the	goals	of	hybridity	or	cosmopolitan	discourse)	or	to	gain	intelligibility	of	
foreign	ways	of	life	as	a	means	to	greater	mutual	understanding.	For	those	hoping	to	
craft	a	viable	political	theory	from	cross-cultural	exchange,	the	issue	is	commensura-
bility	 and	 its	 goal	 or	 resolution	 is	 mutual	 understanding,	 often	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	
h	ermeneutical	 intervention	 from	 a	 self-conscious	 vantage	 point.55	 Individuals	 are	
primary	targets	and	participants	in	this	form	of	interaction:	it	 is	through	individual	
acts	of	comprehension,	psychological	adjustment,	commitment,	and	expression	that	
mutual	 intelligibility	 is	made	possible.	The	possibility	of	 grounding	analysis	 in	an	
alternative	 set	 of	 theoretically	 self-sufficient	 categories,	which	potentially	 offer	 an	
internal	 diversity	 of	 interpretations	 and	 resources,	 is	 never	 broached	 because	 the	
analysis	remains	centered	on	the	trope	or	actual	performance	of	interpersonal	com-
munication	(in	the	case	of	dialogic	and	translation	models)	or	self-awareness	of	one’s	
position	or	cultural	constitution	(as	with	hybridity	and	cosmopolitanism).	However	
much	 each	 individual	 may	 share	 his	 knowledge	 with	 others,	 the	 performance	 of	
cross-cultural	 thinking	 remains	 irreducibly	 individual;	 it	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 social	
transformation,	shared	practices,	or	institution-building.
Many	Western	Learning	thinkers,	in	contrast,	hoped	to	set	into	motion	culturally	
distinct	institutions	and	ways	of	life	that	are,	by	definition,	socially	distributed	and	
performed	rather	than	personally	accessible.	This	difference	in	goal	produces	a	dif-
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ference	in	method,	revealing	to	what	extent	the	mutual-intelligibility	approach	fails	
to	address	both	the	institutionalized	and	interconnected	multiplicity	of	social	life	and	
cultural	meaning	as	well	as	the	need	to	address	and	engage	communities	rather	than	
individuals	in	the	search	for	cross-cultural	knowledge.	Applying	such	a	view	of	learn-
ing	 to	 cross-cultural	 borrowing,	 as	Tan	 does,	 dynamizes	 across	 space	 rather	 than	
simply	across	time	an	anthropological	or	social-science	view	of	cultural	practices.	
Borrowing	a	“culture”	or	one	of	 its	 forms,	 then,	must	somehow	preserve	this	play	
between	shared	symbols,	on	the	one	hand,	and	creative	deployment	of	or	critical	
resistance	to	them,	on	the	other.
Tan’s	 elaboration	 of	 the	 mutually	 constitutive	 qi/dao	 relationship	 offers	 one	
means	through	which	we	can	begin	to	move	cultural	practices	across	spaces	(and	not	
merely	through	time).	By	showing	that	they	are	learned	—	that	is,	learnable —	p	ractices	
that	both	produce	and	inform	a	loosely	coherent	semiotic	system,	Tan	maintains	the	
tension	 between	 tradition	 and	 innovation	 that	 marks	 all	 cultural	 production.	The	
problem	this	introduces,	of	course,	is	that	by	adopting	a	semiotic	system	that	endows	
actions	and	institutions	with	meaning,	such	learning	points	to	society	rather	than	the	
individual	as	the	site	of	transformation.	The	mere	understanding	of	how	given	sys-
tems	work	by	one	individual	is	of	no	direct	use.
The Path Forward
Tan	has	by	no	means	resolved	all	the	dilemmas	of	cross-cultural	borrowing,	but	he	
has	set	them	on	a	productive	new	track.	Specifically,	he	refutes	presumptions	of	the	
intractability	(if	not	the	intelligibility)	of	cultural	difference	amidst	a	world	bereft	of	
objective	points	of	adjudication.	While	many	current	comparative	theorists	and	phi-
losophers	seek	to	counter	false	universalism	by	tying	claims	to	particular,	negotiated	
contexts,	the	unfortunate	result	is	that	cultural	differences	—	whether	or	not	seen	to	
be	derived	from	and	reducible	to	ethnic	differences	—	are	rendered	if	not	unintelli-
gible	then	unusable	to	“outsiders.”	According	to	this	view,	only	mutual	intelligibility	
or	a	hybrid,	emerging	universal	discourse	(not	conversion	or	the	development	of	the	
“other’s”	categories	from	the	inside)	is	possible.	Roxanne	Euben,	for	example,	explic-
itly	justifies	the	task	of	comparative	political	theory	on	the	basis	of	shared	concerns	
that	inform	but	do	not	supplant	Western	discourses:	“non-Western	perspectives	may	
provide	new	(new	to	the	West,	that	is)	answers	to	our	old	questions”56	—	apparently	
leaving	the	capacity	for	posing	questions	firmly	within	already-developed	Western	
modes	of	inquiry.57
“Authenticity”	begins	 to	 refute	 these	 assumptions	by	pointing	 to	 the	 external,	
replicable	practices,	objects,	and	instruments,	or	qi,	that	draw	upon	and/or	constitute	
a	constellation	of	shifting	and	hermeneutically	open	society-wide	values,	commit-
ments,	and	characteristics	(dao),	suggesting	in	turn	dilemmas	that	are	more	complex	
than	those	that	attend	translation,	cross-cultural	dialogue,	or	idiosyncratic	p	erceptions	
of	self	and	other.	For	one,	reading	cross-cultural	exchange	as	the	acquisition	of	daos	
by	the	implementation	of	qi	suggests	that	our	goal	can	be	to	gain	facility	in	wholly	
new	modes	of	 inquiry	rather	 than	simply	to	acquire	substantive	ideas.	Scholars	of	
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particular	daos	affirm	the	theoretical	integrity	of	those	daos	by	actually	fostering	their	
internal	development	—	“going	on”	as	they	do	—	rather	than	simply	documenting	the	
traditions	or	philosophies	existing	within	a	given	context	or	territory.	Although	this	
model	sets	no	limit	on	who	can	meaningfully	pursue	such	developments,	it	does	re-
quire	aggressive	reproduction	of	what	are	perceived	to	be	foundational	premises,	as	
well	as	the	institutions	that	ground	particular	communities	of	inquiry.	The	model	thus	
accounts	for	the	possibility	that	cultural	foundations	—	as	conceptions	that	both	inter-
pret	and	are	interpreted	—	may	exceed	their	expression	in	any	particular	text	or	set	of	
texts,	may	furnish	alternative	counter-discourses	and	internal	critique,	and	may	draw	
from	hitherto	unseen	culturally	embedded	but	not	essentialized	logics	that	can	be	
further	developed	to	form	a	new	research	program	in	a	variety	of	cultural	contexts.
In	some	ways	Tan’s	model	resembles	Alasdair	MacIntyre’s	argument	about	how	
we	gain	access	to	erstwhile	foreign	ways	of	thought.	For	MacIntyre,	learning	a	foreign	
dao	would	involve	learning	a	“second	first	 language”	that	 involves	deep	acquain-
tance	with	not	only	bodies	of	theory	but	also	“the	cultural	and	historical	contexts	in	
and	through	which	they	originally	derived	their	intelligibility	as	part	of	a	sequence	
constituting	that	kind	of	tradition	of	inquiry	which	is	the	bearer	of	a	developing	the-
ory.”58	But	where	MacIntyre	presumes	a	tight	and	nearly	insurmountable	connection	
between	distinct	life	forms	(or	cultures)	and	distinct	bodies	of	theory,59	Tan	under-
scores	the	sometimes	uneven	ascription	of	“cultural”	difference	to	various	life	experi-
ences	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 have	 direct	 relationships	 to	 the	 intellectual	 concerns	
under	 scrutiny,	or	even	 to	culturally	 situated	ways	of	 thinking	at	 all.	With	careful	
cultivation	of	certain	qi,	Tan	claims,	large	parcels	of	Western	“thinking”	can	be	faith-
fully	reproduced	and	developed	in	future	ways	by	Chinese	scholars,	but	he	does	not	
prescribe	in	advance,	or	ever,	the	dao	that	such	qi	ultimately	brings	forth.
The	great	strength	of	Tan’s	idea	is	that	he	gives	us	entry	points	into	what	is	ulti-
mately	a	complex	entity	subject	to	interpretation	and	only	limited	human	compre-
hension.	Dao	in	this	view	is	not	a	circumscribed,	graspable	object,	like	the	idea	of	
“culture”	one	may	glean	from	a	tourist	guidebook,	but	this	does	not	mean	it	is	trac-
table	only	through	interactions	with,	or	the	articulated	self-identity	of,	situated	indi-
viduals.	As	an	interlocked	series	of	interactions	and	knowledge	produced	by	countless	
individuals,	these	daos	are	multilayered	and	rich.	Reproducing	their	premises	does	
produce	something	meaningful,	even	if	necessarily	partial.	Tan’s	notion	of	a	radically	
open-ended	dao	 enables	 a	 form	of	borrowing	 focused	 less	on	 identifying	distinct	
ideas	that	can	be	contributions	to	already	existing	discourses	than	it	is	on	inaugurat-
ing	new	fields	of	inquiry,	as	well	as	new	ways	of	life	in	a	community	of	like-minded	
others.
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